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CURRENT ISSUES
DRUG TESTING AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
The basic purpose of the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution is to safeguard the privacy and security of indi-
viduals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.1 The
Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the fourth
amendment to afford constitutional protection to an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy from unreasonable state intru-
sions.' In order to determine whether the reasonableness require-
U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizure, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. The fourth amendment is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
The roots of the fourth amendment can be traced to the sixteenth century when the
people of England were first subjected to general warrants. See N. LAssoN, HisToav AND
DEvELoPMENT OF THE FoumRT AMENDMENT To THE UNrrwD STATES CONSTrruTON 23-27
(1937). The typical search warrant authorized government agents to search anywhere and
"had been used in the course of ordinary criminal administration as well as in customs
enforcement and the suppression of seditious libel." Id. at 27. Despite objections to the
general warrants by the public and parliament, it was not until two centuries later that they
were condemned by Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029
(1765). Id. at 38. The American counterpart of the general warrant, the writ of assistance,
created the first of a series of frictions between England and the Colonies which led di-
rectly to the revolution. See Leagre, The Fourth Amendrmnt and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. Catn.
L. CRIMINOLOGY & PoLc Sci. 393, 397 (1963). Navigation laws granted agents of the
crown the right to use writs of assistance to search for smuggled goods. IL RuTLAND, THE
BmTm OF THE Bi.± OF RIGTs 1776-91 (1983); N. LASSON, supra, at 54. Opposition to the
writs was so great and so widespread that by the time the Constitutional Convention met in
Philadelphia, every state had adopted a declaration or bill of rights containing a provision
with regard to searches and seizures. N. LASSOs, supra, at 79-82.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (respondent had reasonable
expectation of privacy in contents of double-locked footlocker). The Court in Davis v. Mis-
sissippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), observed: "[njothing is more clear than that the Fourth'
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ments have been satisfied, courts have generally balanced the in-
terests of society against the interests of the individual.
Recently, this fourth amendment balancing test has been ap-
plied in the highly controversial area of drug testing.' The judici-
ary's response to fourth amendment challenges to drug testing has
been described as a "tower of Babel of conflicting decisions."' In
considering society's need to combat drug abuse, several courts
have acknowledged drug abuse as a serious national problem.e
Many commentators have also pointed out that drug abuse is the
cause of tremendous financial loss, 7 as well as the loss of human
Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our
citizenry." Id. at 726.
$ See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (roving-patrol stop
serves significant law enforcement needs while minimally interfering with fourth amend-
ment interests); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (public interest
in making routine checkpoint stops for illegal aliens outweighs interest of private citizen);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (police may search outer clothing of suspicious
persons to discover weapons); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)
(warrantless administrative search of private property unreasonable).
4 For a general discussion of the balancing test utilized see Chineson, Mandatory Drug
Testing: An Invasion of Privacy?, 22 TRIAL 91 (1986); Edwards, Mandatory Drug Testing in the
Workplace, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 34; Feerick, Employee Rights and Substance Abuse,
N.Y.LJ., Feb. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Helsby, Drug Testing in the Workplace, 60 FLA. BAR J. 73
Uune 1986); Kaufman, The Battle Over Drug Testing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1986, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 52; Lamar, Rolling Out The Big Guns, TIME, Sept. 22, 1986, at 25; O'Conner, A
Question Of Privacy, NEwswEEK, Sept. 29, 1986, at 18; Rust, Drug Testing: The Legal Dilemma,
72 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1986, at 50; Stille, Some Judges 'Say No' To Drug Tests, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
6, 1986, at 1; Stille, Drug Testing: The Scene is Set for a Dramatic Legal Collision Between the
Rights of Employees and Workers, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 1.
* Stille, Soe judges 'Say No' to Drug Tests, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 6, 1986, at 1.
* See Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C. 1985). In Turner
the court held that initiation of the drug testing program in the police department wasjustified "in the context of current widespread, large scale drug usage in all segments of
the population." Id. at 1008. See also Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1220
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (drug use among prisoners "is a serious, disruptive problem within Ameri-
can prisons"); Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(increase of drug abuse in Armed Forces threatens "the readiness and efficiency of our
military forces"). Federal experts estimate that between 10% and 23% of U.S. workers use
drugs on the job. Castro, Battling the Enemy Within, TIME, Mar. 17, 1986, at 53.
' See Chineson, supra note 4, at 91. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
worker drug and alcohol abuse costs employers $60 billion annually in lost productivity,
accidents, higher medical claims, increased absenteeism, and theft of company property
which is used to finance some employees' habits. Id. See also Rust, supra note 4, at 53 (drug
abuse costs society about $30 billion a year in absenteeism, production loss and injuries);
Schwed, Institutional America Lines Up to Take Drug Tests, LA. DAILY J., Dec. 5, 1985, at 6,
col. 2 (experts say drug abuse on the job costs corporations up to $100 billion a year in lost
productivity, increased absenteeism, illness, accidents and theft).
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life.' However, in spite of strong public concern over drug use,"
and the salutary results that some drug testing programs have
boasted,10 courts have insisted that drug testing practices defer to
fourth amendment requirements. 1 One court has noted that
while the drug abuse problem poses a serious threat to society, "it
is important not to permit fear and panic to overcome our funda-
mental principles and protections. 11
This article will discuss the major drug testing decisions in the
public sector1 3 and outline the various factors the courts have
See Rangel, Transit Mishaps Tied to Drugs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1986, at B2, col. 5.
New York transit officials estimate that since 1984, seven incidents, two involving fatalities,
occurred in which a subway motorman was found to have been using illegal drugs or alco-
hol. Id. Since 1975, about 50 train accidents have been drug or alcohol related. In those
accidents, 37 people were killed, 80 were injured, and over $34 million worth of property
was destroyed. Castro, supra note 6, at 53.
I See Battle Strategies, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 71. Seventy-two percent of people sur-
veyed in a New York Times/CBS News poll said they would be willing to undergo drug
testing. Id.; Lamar, supra note 4, at 26 (poll showed that given a choice, 81% of people
would agree to be tested for drug use).
" See Edwards, supra note 4, at 34. In 1981 Georgia Power Company employees suf-
fered 5.4 injuries per 200,000 man-hours at its Vogtle nuclear power plant construction
site. Id. at 35. In 1985, after instituting a drug testing program, this rate dropped to less
than .5 injuries per 200,000 man-hours. Id. Likewise, in 1982, the U.S. Navy identified 48
percent of the enlisted men as having used illicit drugs. Id. As a result of drug testing, this
figure dropped to 4 percent in 1985. Id. See also Stille, Drug Testing: The Scene is Set for a
Dramatic Legal Collision Between the Rights of Employers and Workers, NAT'L L.J., April 7,
1986, at 22. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. claims that the institution of random
drug testing has reduced its accident rate by 67% and has reduced lost time and injuries by
over 25%. Id.
Is See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1985). The McDon-
ell court observed:
Taking and testing body fluid specimens, as well as conducting searches and seizures
of other kinds, would help the employer discover drug use and other useful informa-
tion about employees. There is no doubt about it - searches and seizures can yield a
wealth of information useful to the searcher. (That is why King George III's men so
frequently searched the colonists.) That potential, however, does not make a govern-
mental employer's search of an employee a constitutionally reasonable one.
Id. at 1130.
" Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1522 (D.N.J. 1986).
" Private employers who choose to implement drug testing programs face no constitu-
tional impediments since the fourth amendment only applies to searches conducted by the
government. Helsby, supra note 4, at 73; Kaufman, supra note 4, at 69. However, private
employers that test for drugs may be vulnerable to tort liability or to liability for breach of
contract. See Schachter and Geidt, Controlling Workers' Substance Abuse, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11,
1986, at 1, col 1. In addition, drug testing in the private sector can be limited by the
political process. For example, the city of San Francisco recently passed an ordinance
prohibiting mandatory blood or urine testing by private employers unless the employer
had reason to believe that the employee's faculties were impaired on the job and such
impairment presented a danger to his own safety or the safety of others. Chineson, supra
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taken into consideration when deciding the constitutionality of
drug testing programs. In light of the developing case law in this
area, this article will suggest that the constitutionality of a particu-
lar drug testing program may depend on the type of employment
the individual is engaged in,"" and the presence or absence of sus-
picion that the employee is using controlled substances. 5 While
other factors are also considered,' e these two factors seem to have
weighed heavily in the courts' decisions.
I. THE SEARCH
The threshold inquiry in any fourth amendment analysis is
whether the state's conduct constitutes a search within the mean-
ing of the amendment.1 7 In Katz v. United States," Justice Harlan,
in his concurrence, posited a formulation for determining
whether a search had indeed been conducted: (1) a person must
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and
(2) the expectation was one that society was prepared to recognize
as reasonable." Thus, it has been held that one cannot have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in what "a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home."' 0
note 4, at 95. For a sampling of the controversy surrounding drug testing in the private
sector see Rothstein, Screening Workers for Drugs: A Legal and Ethical Framework, II EM-
PLOYE.S RE- LJ. 422; Bishop, Drug Testing Comes to Work, 6 CAUnF. LAW. 28 (April 1986);
Dentzer, Cohn, Raine, Carroll, Quade, Can You Pass The Job Test?, NEwswEm, May 5, 1986,
at 46; Castro, supra note 6, at 52; Gest, Using Drugs? You May Not Get Hired, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1985, at 38.
H See infra notes 31-54 and accompanying text.
IS See imfra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
IS See infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
I' See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.
Supp. 482, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Alderman, Dragnet Drug Testing In Public Schools And The
Fourth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 852, 855 (1986).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
I Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz the Supreme Court held that the police
may not electronically eavesdrop on telephone conversations made from a public booth
without first obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause. Id. at 353.
Os United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United States' 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). Applying the notion that one cannot have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in an area knowingly exposed to the public, id., the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that requiring an individual to produce a voice exemplar, United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1 (1973), or a handwriting sample, United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973), is
not a search because there is no justifiable expectation of privacy with respect to speech
and handwriting since these are constantly exposed to the public.
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In Schmerber v. California," the Supreme Court was faced with a
similar problem albeit in another context. The Court concluded
that extraction of a blood sample from defendant for purposes of
determining his state of intoxication was a search which would
have to come within the parameters of the fourth amendment."
Relying primarily on the analysis in Schmerber, several courts have
concluded that it is a search to require an individual to submit a
urine sample for the purpose of detecting the use of controlled
substances."8
II. THE REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT
Upon a finding that the state's conduct amounts to a search, the
next question to be addressed is whether such a search is reasona-
ble." Typically, a search is considered reasonable where a warrant
based on probable cause has been sought before the search is con-
ducted,"5 but exceptions have been carved out where the intrusion
" 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schuerber petitioner had been arrested at a hospital while
receiving treatment for injuries he had sustained in a car accident. Id. at 758. At the direc-
tion of a police officer, a blood sample was taken by a physician. Id. Analysis of the sample
revealed that petitioner had been intoxicated at the time of the accident. Id. at 759. This
evidence was admitted at petitioner's trial for the criminal offense of driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. Id.
nId. Likewise in Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), the Supreme Court held that
the taking of fingernail scrapings constituted a search. Id. at 295. The Court stated that
"the Fourth Amendment guarantee of freedom from 'unreasonable searches and seizures'
is clearly implicated." Id. at 294.
" See, e.g., Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (urinalysis
found to be analogous to blood test). The Storms court noted that while urinalysis does not
involve forced penetration of body tissues, as does a blood test, "it does involve the invol-
untary extraction of body fluids." Id. See also Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089,
1098 (D.N.J. 1985), af'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Mc-
Donell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985). But see Turner v. Fraternal
Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1011 (D.C. 1985) (Nebeker, J., concurring) (it would
"strain logic to conclude" that urinalysis constitutes a search); Allen v. City of Marietta,
601 F. Supp. 482, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (court doubts whether requiring person to provide
urine sample for analysis is search contemplated by Framers, yet constrained by current law
to hold that it is).
U See Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
U.S. CONsr. amend. IV; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29
(1967).
Different views concerning the necessity of obtaining a search warrant have been ad-
hered to throughout the history of the fourth amendment. See Stelzner, The Fourth Amend-
ment: The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 N.M.L. REV. 33 (1979). The classic expres-
sion of these conflicting views is found in the majority opinion of Justice Minton and in"
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seems reasonable in light of the governmental purpose. 6 In the
case of testing of body fluids, courts have held that a warrant is
not necessary where delay may cause the drug or alcohol tracings
to dissipate.' 7 Thus, urinalysis must be tested by the fourth
amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures.28 In determining whether an individual has exhib-
ited a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts have generally
weighed society's need to search against the invasion which the
search entails."
Justice Frankfurter's dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Justice
Minton observed that "it is unreasonable searches that are prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment. It was recognized by the framers of the Constitution that there were reasona-
ble searches for which no warrant was required." Id. at 60. Dissenting in Rabinowitz, Justice
Frankfurter wrote:
When the Fourth Amendment outlawed "unreasonable searches" and then went on
to define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magis-
trate could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a
search is "unreasonable" unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions jus-
tified by absolute necessity.
Id. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Although Minton's majority opinion has been over-
ruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the modern counterpart of the contro-
versy focuses on the issue of when and under what circumstances the Supreme Court will
allow relaxation of the warrant requirement. See Stelzner, supra, at 35.
" See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to consent upheld); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (warrantless
search reasonable since evidence fell within plain .view of officer); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (warrantless search justified where officers in "hot pursuit" of felon);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (warrantless search incident to arrest per-
missible); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search of vehicle
upheld).
As the Supreme Court noted in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967):
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the pub-
lic interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to
search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search.
Id.
" See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (no warrant necessary to take blood
from person in car accident to test for intoxication); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit
Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029
(1976). But see Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1011 (D.C. 1985)
(Nebeker, J. concurring) (urinalysis can detect narcotics seven days after use thus officer
does not have to give on-the-spot sample).
" See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1967).
" See supra note 3 and accompanying text. For a sampling of drug testing cases which
balance society's need to search against the invasion which the search entails see Capua v.
City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp.
1089, 1100 (D.N.J. 1985), affd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986);
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A. Needs of Society
Each individual's privacy interest is shaped by the context in
which it is asserted." Thus, whether employee drug testing is rea-
sonable must be evaluated with reference to the environment in
the different places of employment.31 In light of this principle,
courts have been particularly sensitive to the needs of society
when the governmental drug testing occurs in one of the follow-
ing situations: when the main function of the employee is to stand
guard over the interests of society," when the employee is en-
gaged in an extremely hazardous profession," or when the drug
testing takes place in an area that has traditionally been highly
regulated by the government.3" Although the existence of one of
these characteristics is not dispositive of the issue of constitution-
ality, it is suggested that the presence of one or more of these
characteristics weighs heavily in the balance.
Courts have more readily approved of urinalysis where the em-
ployee has been responsible for protecting the safety of others and
where that employee is frequently confronted with emergency sit-
uations." Thus, a drug abuse prevention plan which involved
urinalysis of soldiers was upheld because "the military forces are
charged with the responsibility of continuously protecting the na-
tion's interests"" and drug abuse "poses a substantial threat to
the readiness and efficiency of our military forces. 31 7 Likewise in
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police," the court upheld urinalysis of
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C. 1985); Allen v. City of
Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214,
1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 538
F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Patchogue-Medford Con-
gress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 App. Div. 2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (2d Dep't.
1986); Seelig v. McMickens, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 7, 1986, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 7,
1986).
" See United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir.), cerm denied, 469 U.S.
846 (1984).
"1 See McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1128 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (correctional
facility).
n See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
U See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
- See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
N Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
"Id.500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985).
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police officers, noting that "given the nature of the work and the
fact that not only his life, but the lives of the public rest upon his
alertness, the necessity of rational action and a clear head un-
befuddled by narcotics becomes self-evident."' " In Everett v. Nap-
per," the court upheld drug testing of firefighters since "drug use
among firefighters could impact negatively on their job fitness and
performance, thereby threatening the safety of the community."1' 1
When an employee is engaged in very dangerous work which
could cause severe injury to the employee, his coworkers, or the
public, courts have also been more likely to uphold urinalysis as
reasonable." Thus, urinalysis of bus and train operators'8 as well
as correctional officers who drive prison vans and buses" has been
held to be reasonable. Likewise, drug testing of city employees
who worked around high voltage electric wires has been held con-
stitutional under the fourth amendment." Using similar logic,
Id. at 1008. See also City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985). In City of Palm Bay the court noted:
Police officers use weapons, drive vehicles and make instant judgements involving
life and death. They, too, must be possessed of all their normal faculties. In addition,
they are sworn to enforce the law and must have credibility if public confidence and
respect is to be maintained. Known use of illegal substances would undermine that
confidence and respect.
Id. at 1324. However, even after considering this important state interest, the court still
concluded that the drug testing program in question was unconstitutional. Id.
" 632 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986). It should be noted that in Everett the firefighter
refused to submit to urinalysis. Id. As a result the court decided that no search had oc-
curred and therefore the fourth amendment was not implicated. Id. at 1484. However, the
court decided that it was not arbitrary and capricious in violation of due process to suspend
and ultimately terminate firefighters who refused to submit to drug testing. Id. at 1485-86.
"1 Id. at 1485. See also City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (firefighters must be able to think clearly on the job since their lives and the
lives of others are at stake); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986)
(court noted that while the deleterious effects of drug consumption on firefighters' ability
to perform their duties is an issue legitimately within the city's concern, the means chosen
to achieve the city's goal were not reasonable).
" See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
" Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267
(7th Cir.) (public interest outweighs any individual interest in refusing to disclose physical
evidence of intoxication or drug abuse), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
, See Seelig v. McMickens, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 7, 1986, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
Aug. 7, 1986). The court in Seelig noted the risk to the public from prisoners who escape
after a bus accident caused by a driver who was impaired by alcohol or drugs. Id.
" See Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985). The court held
that the city of Marietta had the right to make warrantless searches of its employees to
discover if they were using drugs which would affect their ability to work with hazardous
materials. Id. See also Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985), af'd, 795
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courts have struck down drug testing when a particular job does
not pose a substantial threat of injury to the employee or to the
public." Thus, society's interest in detecting drug users in the
teaching profession was not strong enough to withstand constitu-
tional attack."
Yet another area where courts have been sympathetic to the
public's need to ferret out drug users involves highly regulated
sectors of society whose members are deemed to have a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy.4 Members of the military, for exam-
ple, have been considered to have a lower expectation of privacy
than the average citizen.' Individuals who work" or live8" in a
F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986). The Shoemaker court reasoned:
A jockey must be in full possession of his mental faculties and physical capabilities,-
his coordination, skill, and reflex ability are critical to good performance. The risk
of serious injury is apparent, given the speed and closeness with which large num-
bers of horses run during a race. Even the slightest decrease in alertness and reflex
ability increases the danger of accidents, including multiple horse and jockey acci-
dents causing grave injury and death.
Id. at 1102.
, See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
See Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 App. Div. 2d 35,
505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (2d Dep't 1986). The court observed:
We are cognizant of the fact that illegal drug usage can have an adverse impact upon
a teacher's ability to safeguard and supervise pupils in his or her charge. However,
the need of public employers to conduct urine tests to ascertain illegal drug usage in
the teaching profession, important as it may be, is not as crucial as in other govern-
mental positions, such as that of police officer, firefighter, bus driver, or train engi-
neer, where, given the nature of the work, the use of controlled substances would
ordinarily pose situations fraught with imminent and grave consequences to public
safety.
Id. See also Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986). In Jones the District Court
for the District of Columbia held unreasonable, as applied to plaintiff, a drug testing pro-
gram which tested all Transportation Department employees whether or not they were
suspected of drug use. Plaintiff was a bus attendant whose duties involved helping handi-
capped students on and off the school bus and assisting them in transit. Id. at 1503.
"See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
, See Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (the
soldier unlike his civilian counterpart, is subject to "extensive regulation by his military
superiors"). Cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 787 (1974) (some of serviceman's rights may
be overridden by needs of military); Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1332 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (courts must balance needs of military against serviceman's rights).
" See King v. McMickens, 120 App. Div. 2d 351, 501 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1st Dep't 1986)
(prison guards must submit to urinalysis since they are subject to "paramilitary discipline").
Cf. Armstrong v. New York State Comm'r of Corrections, 545 F. Supp. 728 (N.D.N.Y.
1982) (warrantless search of prison guard acceptable if found to be reasonable under the
circumstances). But see McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985). In Mc-
Donel, the court held that Iowa's objective in discovering which officers were using drugs
and therefore might be more likely than others to smuggle drugs to prisoners is far too
attenuated to make the search reasonable. Id. at 1130.
" See Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (prisoners may be sub-
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correctional facility, "a unique place fraught with serious security
dangers,"" also have a diminished expectation of privacy. In addi-
tion, since "horse racing is one of a special class of relatively
unique industries which have been subject to pervasive and con-
tinuous regulation by the state,"" random urinalysis and breath-
alyzer tests of jockeys have been upheld as reasonable.5
B. The Invasion Which the Search Entails
When evaluating the invasion which the search entails, courts
are in agreement that urinalysis is "not an extreme body inva-
sion."6 ' In evaluating the intrusiveness of the search, courts have
jected to random drug testing to insure safety of institution); Hampson v. Satran, 319
N.W.2d 796, 799 (N.D. 1982) (state penitentiary urinalysis program dealt with institution's
drug problem reasonably and did not intrude on inmates' rights).
Courts have also noted that probationers have a diminished expctation of privacy. See
United States v. Williams, 787 F.2d 1182, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986) (upheld urinalysis as condi-
tion of probation since probation is "penal alternative to incarceration"); Macias v. State,
649 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (requiring weekly urinalysis as condition of
probation does not constitute unreasonable search and seizure).
U Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). At issue in Bell was a New York City federal
jail policy that required all prisoners to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as
part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with outsiders. Id. at 558. After
weighing the "significant and legitimate security interests of the institution against the pri-
vacy interests of the inmates," the court concluded that the search was reasonable. Id. at
560.
" Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1102 (D.N.J. 1985), affd, 795 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986). Cf United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316
(1972) (warranties search of gun store upheld since firearms industry pervasively regu-
lated); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (court noted liquor
industry has traditionally been subject to close supervision and inspection); Delquidice v.
New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 100 N.J. 79, 90, 494 A.2d 1007, 1012 (1985) (horse racing
industry pervasively regulated); In re Martin, 90 N.J. 295, 304, 447 A.2d 1290, 1299
(1982) (warrantless searches of casino employees upheld because industry traditionally
regulated).
U Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1104 (D.N.J. 1985), affd, 795 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
" Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1101 (D.N.J. 1985) (Supreme Court consid-
ers breathalyzer tests and urinalysis less intrusive than body cavity and strip searches), affd,
795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Turner v. Fraternal Order of
Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1009 (D.C. 1985) (urinalysis requires "a normal bodily function").
See Seelig v. McMickens, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 7, 1986, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 7,
1986). The court in Seelig observed: "This court is not faced with the degree of physical
intrusion involved in the humiliating and degrading strip searches or body cavity searches
dealt with in most of the relevant case law." Id. But see Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp.
1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (forcing someone to urinate into a bottle held by another is
"purely and simply degrading").
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considered the testing procedure itself and the degree of individu-
alized suspicion present before conducting the search."
1. The Testing Procedure
One aspect of the drug testing procedure involves the accuracy
of the particular test used. The most commonly used urine test is
known as EMIT (Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Test).57 The
Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia found EMIT to be
97 to 99% accurate." The question of reliability usually arises
when the EMIT test is not confirmed by the use of a more sophis-
ticated test6' as the manufacturer of EMIT recommends."
" See Alderman, supra note 17, at 864-74. One commentator has outlined three factors
relating to the substance of the search: the intrusiveness of the search, the efficacy of the
search, and whether the subject of the search otherwise generates articulable grounds for
suspicion. Id. He has also posited two procedural factors: the nature of the statutory and
regulatory scheme authorizing the search, and the limit on the discretion of the official
conducting the search. Id.
s7 See Rust, supra note 4, at 51. EMIT (Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Test) has been
criticized for being unable to detect whether the subject of the test is under the influence
at the time the test is administered. Alderman, supra note 17, at 854. Alcohol can be de-
tected in an individual's system for twelve hours, cocaine for two or three days after con-
sumption, and marijuana for two weeks to two months. See Schwed, supra note 7, at 6;
Stille, Drug Testing: The Scene is Set for a Dramatic Legal Collision Between the Rights of Employ-
ers and Workers, NAT'L L.J., April 7, 1986, at 24. One court noted that the urinalysis pro-
gram in question guarded against tests which might punish the individual for his private
behavior off the regulated premises. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J.
1985) (drug testing of jockeys), ao'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 577
(1986). However, in City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) the court stated: "The City has the right to adopt a policy which prohibits police
officers and firefighters from using controlled substances at any time while they are so em-
ployed, whether such use is on or off the job." 475 So. 2d at 1326. EMIT has also been
criticized as being unable to distinguish between illegal drugs and over-the-counter medica-
tion which often gives a false reading. Set Rust, supra note 4, at 51.
" Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35, 38 (D.N.D. 1984). See also Castro, supra note 6, at 58
(EMIT is "97% accurate in the best of circumstances").
" See Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (D.D.C. 1986) (EMIT test first done
by computer then repeated manually, but not otherwise confirmed); Storms v. Coughlin,
600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (EMIT test performed twice but not confirmed by
alternative method). If EMIT is not properly performed or is not confirmed by another
method it can have a high rate of error. See Rust, supra note 4, at 51 (urine screen gives
false readings between 5 and 20 percent of the time); Stille, Drug Testing: The Scene is Set for
a Dramatic Legal Collision Between the Rights of Employers and Workers, NA'L L.J., April 7,
1986, at 24 (error rates in various studies fluctuated between 3 and 20 percent); Schweb,
supra note 7, at 6 (Center for Disease Control study found sloppy laboratory work in iso-
lated cases caused inaccuracy rate of up to 100 percent in urine tests).
" See Chineson, supra note 4, at 91. However, confirmatory tests cost from $40 to $80
each as compared with $5 for the initial test. Id.
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Another aspect of the testing procedure that courts have con-
sidered in the balancing process is the method of administering
the test. Forcing an individual to urinate into a bottle held by an-
other has been described as "purely and simply degrading." In
Capua v. City of Plainfield," Judge Sarokin compared surveillance
during urine collection to a strip search." Yet, in Shoemaker v.
Handel," the court upheld the Racing Commission's policy of de-
taining, for as long as an hour, jockeys unable to give a urine sam-
ple because of rapid weight loss prior to the race." In McDonell v.
Hunter," the court noted that a fundamental problem with the
Corrections Department drug testing policy was that it failed to
identify who had the authority to require an employee to submit
to urinalysis, and that it did not provide any written standards to
implement the policy. 7
2. The Degree of Individualized Suspicion Present
To accommodate public and private interests some quantum of
01 Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see Tucker v. Dickey,
613 F. Supp. 1124 (D. Wis. 1985). The Tucker court observed:
The lack of advance notice was compounded by the manner in which the sampling
was conducted. Plaintiff was awakened from sleep, handed a container and a note
explaining the proceedings in a very cursory fashion, and told to urinate into the
container. There does not appear to have been any reason for conducting the sam-
pling in such a fashion, which could only heighten the offensiveness of an already
offensive and intrusive procedure.
Id. at 1131.
2 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
See id. at 1514. Judge Sarokin in Capua observed:
The requirement of surveillance during the urine collection forces those tested to
expose part of their anatomy to the testing official in a manner akin to strip search
. . . A urine test done under close surveillance of a government representative, re-
gardless of how professionally or courteously conducted, is likely to be a very em-
barassing and humiliating experience.
Id.
" 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
577 (1986).
" Id. at 1096. The court found the Racing Commission's policy of detaining jockeys
unable to give a urine sample because of rapid weight loss reasonable so long as the period
of time that the jockey was detained in order to give a sample was minimal. Id. at 1104.
" 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
" Id. at 1128 n.4. See City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Alderman, supra note 17, at 864. One commentator has observed: "Codifica-
tion of the program is evidence that a legislative or administrative body has approved of
the search; it also provides guidelines for those charged with carrying out the search. Al-
derman, supra note 17, at 864.
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individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional
search or seizure." However, such a requirement is not abso-
lute.69 In balancing the interests involved in drug testing, most
courts have placed great weight on the existence of some degree
of individualized suspicion. 70 However, other courts have recog-
nized that reasonable suspicion is not necessary if the drug testing
program in question has certain procedural safeguards that pro-
tect the individual from possible abuses of discretion. 1
Several courts have explicitly stated that reasonable suspicion is
necessary to make drug testing reasonable, even in the face of a
vital state interest.7 2 In Jones v. McKenzie,73 the state argued that
mandatory urinalysis of Transportation Department employees
was justified on the basis of the increase in traffic accidents and
U Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). The Prouse Court noted: "the reasonable-
ness standard usually requires at a minimum that the facts upon which an intrusion is based
be capable of measurement against an objective standard whether this be probable cause or
a less stringent test." Id. at 654. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560
(1976); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1100 (D.N.J. 1985), affd, 795 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
U See Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1100 (D.N.J. 1985), affd, 795 F.2d
1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 546 (1976): Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara the
Supreme Court stated that "specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling"
is not necessary to justify inspection of private residences for the building code violations,
only area warrants are necessary. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
70 See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
"' See Rust, supra note 4, at 53. One commentator believes that a "random" drug testing
program would pass constitutional challenge. Id.
" See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1516-18 (D.N.J. 1986)
(firefighters); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1128 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (correctional
institution employees); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (police and firefighters).
Under the reasonable suspicion standard a search is justified only if the employer can
point to specific objective facts and rational inferences that he is entitled to draw from the
facts in light of his experiences. See City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1325
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The court in City of Palm Bay rejected the requirement of proba-
ble cause because it "imposes too severe a standard." Id. Other courts have rejected the
probable cause standard on the ground that it is unnecessary when the search is not aimed
at the discovery of evidence for use in a criminal trial. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 538 (1967); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119
App. Div. 2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888, 891 (2d Dep't 1986); King v. McMickens, 120 App.
Div. 2d 351, 501 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Ist Dep't 1986). In Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.
Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986), the court rejected the "mere suspicion" standard because, "the
imposition of an individualized, reasonable suspicion standard rather than the more strin-
gent probable cause standard ...[was] already a significant concession of deference to the
state's legitimate interests." Id. at 1518.
's 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
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absenteeism, several incidents of erratic behavior of some Depart-
ment employees, and the discovery of syringes and bloody needles
in Transportation Department restrooms. 4 The court rejected
this argument, emphasizing that the Department must suspect a
particular employee of using drugs before it can require the em-
ployee to submit to urinalysis.75 Thus, "the reasonable suspicion
standard requires individualized suspicion, specifically directed to
the person who is targeted for the search. 1"7  This requirement of
reasonable suspicion was found to exist in the drug testing pro-
gram instituted by the Chicago Transit Authority in Division 241
Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy. 7 Under this pro-
gram, bus operators were required to submit to blood and urine
tests when they were involved in "any serious accident" or "sus-
pected of being under the influence" of drugs." In fact, in one
case where the drug testing program at issue was unclear as to the
degree of individualized suspicion necessary before an employee
would be required to submit to urinalysis, the court construed the
directive to require reasonable suspicion. T
74 Id. at 1507-08.
7s Id. at 1508. However, the court in Jones hinted that school bus drivers or mechanics
might reasonably be subjected to drug testing without particularlized suspicion. Id. at 1508.
" Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (D.N.J. 1986). Cf. Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1979) (warrant to search bar and bartender did not authorize
search of customers). But see Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (not
unreasonable to subject students to canine sniff for drugs despite no individualized suspi-
cion), affd in part and remanded in part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1022 (1981).
538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
" Id. at 1267.
See Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985). The Turner
court noted:
Under Paragraph 2 of Special Order 83-21, all members of the force may be or-
dered to submit to urinalysis if "suspected of drug use" by a Department official.
While it might have been drafted with more precision, the special order's reference
to "suspected" drug use does not grant the Department carte blanche to order test-
ing on a purely subjective basis. Rather, the term "suspected" must be construed
here as requiring a reasonable, objective basis for medical investigation through
urinalysis.
Id. at 1008-09. See also King v. McMickens, 119 App. Div. 2d 351, 501 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1st
Dep't 1986). King is a unique case because there was no established drug testing policy at
issue. In King "the Inspector General's office of the Correction Department received a
report from the Office of Special Prosecutor that a confidential informant had alleged that
petitioners were involved in illegal drug activities." Id. at 680. The court held that the
information furnished by the informant provided the basis for a reasonable suspicion that
petitioners were engaged in activity inappropriate to their office. Id. at 681.
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Although reasonable suspicion is usually the rule, a few courts
have upheld drug testing in the absence of any individualized sus-
picion.3 0 In Shoemaker v. Handel,1 at issue was the Racing Com-
mission's drug testing policy which selected jockeys at random to
undergo urinalysis. Under this program the names of all jockeys
participating in a given race were placed in an envelope, and the
steward drew the names of three to five jockeys for testing." In
upholding the program, the court noted that "[sjtandardless and
unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when
in previous cases it has insisted on some degree of individualized
suspicion. 683 In fact, the court pointed out that "a testing ap-
proach which requires some element of individualized suspicion
would actually increase the ability of the steward to act in an arbi-
trary and unreasonable manner by enabling him to select jockeys
for testing without any clearly defined and objective behavioral
criteria for detecting impairment.""
" See, e.g., Seelig v. McMickens, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 7, 1986, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
Aug. 7, 1986) (N.Y. Department of Corrections ran drug tests on urine already collected
for other tests in course of employee's regular physical); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F.
Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985) (jockeys may be tested for drugs in the absence of individualized
suspicion), af'd. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Storms v.
Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (constitutionally valid to subject prison in-
mates to random drug testing in the absence of individualized suspicion).
81 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985), af'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
577 (1986).
" Id. at 1094.
88 Id. at 1101 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)). In Proust the
Supreme Court held that stopping an automobile to check the driver's license and registra-
tion in the absence of at least "articulable suspicion" is unreasonable under the fourth
amendment. 440 U.S. at 662. However, the Court pointed out:
This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from develop-
ing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the
unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at road-
block-type stops is one possible alternative.
440 U.S. at 663. See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In Marti-
nez border patrol agents stopped all passing motorists at a permanent fixed checkpoint for
questioning of the vehicle's occupants to determine if they were illegal aliens. Id. at 545-47.
In upholding the propriety of the stop the Supreme Court held that such stops "may be
made in the absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints." Id.
at 562. The Court considered fixed checkpoint-type stops reasonable and declared that
"since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for
abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops."
Id. at 559.
" Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1103 (D.N.J. 1985), affd, 795 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986). One commentator has pointed out: "a drug
testing program may appear more reasonable when it applies to all employees within a
Journal of Legal Commentary
The court in Storms v. Coughlin," was similarly concerned about
the potential for abuse and harassment in a drug testing pro-
gram. 86 In Storms, the Ossining Correctional Facility instituted a
drug testing policy which tested two groups of inmates each day.8"
One group consisted of those inmates suspected of drug use and
the other group consisted of prisoners selected at random from
the entire population of the facility." The name of each prisoner
was written on a card and pinned to a board in the watch com-
mander's office. 8" Those inmates whose cards were picked off the
board by the watch commander were ordered to report for urinal-
ysis.' 0 Although the court upheld the drug testing program in
Storms as reasonable, 1 the court condemned the method by which
the prisoners were selected for testing because it carried an "un-
necessary risk of harassment." '" The court granted injunctive re-
lief to the extent that the prison official could not be aware of the
identity of the prisoners while he was selecting them.'3 The in-
mates had to be "chosen blindly.""
Although Shoemaker and Storms involved the selection of individ-
uals for drug testing by lottery, testing individuals for drug use
given group, not just those who stir the boss's whimsy." Kaufman, supra note 4, at 66.
" 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
t Id. at 1223.
07 Id. at 1216.
" Id. As to the group of prisoners selected at random from the entire population of the
facility, the court in Storms did not demand any degree of individualized suspicion before a
prison official could require an inmate to submit to urinalysis. In coming to this conclusion
the court relied on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), which upheld highly intrusive
body cavity searches of prisoners after they had any contact with a visitor. Storms, 600 F.
Supp. at 1219-20. The court pointed out in Bell that visitors were searched before entry,
and during the visits the inmates were required to wear one-piece jumpsuits. Id. at 1220.
Also, the visits took place in a glass enclosed room under the scrutiny of officers. Id. Thus
the court concluded:
The level of drug use is high enough in all prisons that it seems much more likely
that any inmate picked at random from the Ossining prison population would be
under their influence than that a Bell inmate could sucessfully maneuver contraband
into his or her body cavities. It is this level of probability which lies at the heart of
-cause."
Id.
" Id. at 1216.
so Id.
oI Id.
- Id. at 1226.
tId.
'Id.
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during their regular physical examination has also been upheld as
reasonable. In Seelig v. McMickens,"I corrections officers assigned
to driving prison buses were required to undergo a biennial physi-
cal examination." Controversy arose when the Department of
Correction wished to run drug tests on the urine already collected
for other tests." Applying the balancing test, the court held the
Department's policy reasonable under the fourth amendment. 8
Another rationale for upholding drug testing in the absence of
individualized suspicion was expounded by the court in Allen v.
City of Marietta." Without discussing the existence of reasonable
suspicion, the court concluded that drug testing of city electrical
workers was reasonable because "the government has the same
right as any private employer to oversee its employees and investi-
gate potential misconduct relevant to the employee's performance
of his duties." 1 "0
CONCLUSION
"In order to win the war against drugs, we must not sacrifice
the life of the Constitution in the battle."' 0 1 This can be avoided
by carefully considering the interests of society and the fourth
amendment interests of the individual in the context of the special
circumstances surrounding the drug testing program.
Leslie A. Harasym
- Seelig v. McMickens, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 7, 1986, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 7,
1986).
e See Fox, Tests for Narcotics, Alcohol Upheld for Correction Officers, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 7, 1986,
at 1, col. 3.
" Seelig v. McMickens, N.Y.L., Aug. 7, 1986, at 7, col. 3. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug.
7, 1986).
- Id.
e 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
I ld. at 491.
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986).
